Infantry, cavalry, armor, and air power have come and go in importance as technology and tactics change, but sea power is the perennial king of interstate warfare. Even the Romans, famous for their undeniably supreme infantry forces, had to bootstrap a navy to use their legions to good effect against Carthage in the First Punic War.

The modern nuclear-powered supercarrier, often the first asset deployed when an international crisis sparks, is the ultimate symbol of sea power and force projection today. First experimented with a century ago, new classes of aircraft carrier are still developed by the US Navy, providing worthy centerpieces for formidable Carrier Battle Groups (CVBGs). But before there was the carrier or the steel battleship, there was the ship-of-the-line, which provided the naval might for seafaring empires that spanned the globe.

Sea power and force projection capabilities are exceptionally expensive luxuries today, as evidenced by the very short list of aircraft carriers in service. So how much did a ship-of-the-line cost in the past, and how does that compare to the modern cost of naval supremacy?

Take the famous HMS Victory as a starting point. According to the Royal Navy’s HMS Victory website, the ship cost £63,176 at her launch in 1765. The United Kingdom’s GDP in 1765 was about £89.43 million, so the Victory accounted for about .07% of GDP* and 1.03% of defense spending**. The website describes this as the equivalent cost of building an aircraft carrier today.

* The caveat, of course, is that ship construction costs are not incurred at the time of launch, nor does construction represent the total cost of acquiring, maintaining, and using sea power. For simplicity, we will compare all construction costs only and GDP at time of launch.

** The only figure I could find for defense spending in 1765 is £6.13 million on UKPublicSpending.co.uk, which sourced the data from B.R. Mitchell’s British Historical Statistics.

Let’s take the USS Abraham Lincoln as an example of a modern aircraft carrier. Launched in 1988, the Nimitz-class carrier’s Wikipedia entry says it cost $4.726 billion in 2010 dollars, giving it an inflation-adjusted 1988 price of $2.598 billion according to the Westegg inflation calculator. According to IMF data, the US had a nominal GDP of $5.1 trillion in 1988, so the USS Abraham Lincoln accounted for about .05% of GDP that year. SIPRI data reports US nominal defense spending in 1988 was $293.09 billion, so the carrier would have accounted for .88% of defense spending if the cost had been all incurred that fiscal year.

But the HMS Victory is a British ship, after all, so perhaps the Royal Navy was referring to a modern UK carrier. For that comparison, let’s use the Invincible-class of light aircraft carrier. The HMS Invincible cost £184.5 million in 1980, accounting for .08% of GDP and 1.38% of defense spending, while the HMS Ark Royal cost £332.9 million in 1985, at .09% of GDP and 1.74% of defense spending.

So at the very least, we can say that the HMS Victory cost the United Kingdom about the equivalent of a modern light aircraft carrier. But a few more examples never hurt:

¹ Based on reasonable extrapolation of 1671 GDP. Earliest GDP figure available is for 1692.
² Unlike the others, this is a screw-driven ship.
³ When faced with differing estimates by renowned naval historians, I went with the one who teaches at my alma mater. Go King’s!

^{1, 2} Years of commission

If you notice my figures are off or math is bad, please drop a comment so I can fix it.

Whether you’re interested in joining the US Foreign Service or want to gain a better idea of what life is really like for American diplomats, reading blogs written by FSOs and their families provides a great, personal perspective on  the American foreign policy machine from Foggy Bottom to the world over.

Don’t forget to check out the Foreign Service Reading List for even more in-depth reading and preparation for the Foreign Service Officer’s Test.

Below is a non-exhaustive list of some of the most interesting blogs written by current or former FSOs and FSO spouses. Among other things, they discuss the grueling application process, the daily office life overseas and at home, family life, the challenges of moving every two years, and personal reactions to major events like the deaths of Ambassador Christopher Stevens and Anne Smedinghoff. If you’re a fan of the Cable at Foreign Policy, take a look at some of these blogs for a more personal perspective.

Most of theses blogs have been around for many years, so if you find one you like it is definitely worth checking out archived posts to see how a tour and diplomatic career progresses over time.

• ForeignServiceTest.com – A fantastic resource, this blog is written by a current Foreign Service who touches on a wide range of topics, including preparing for the FSOT and “inside information” on FSO culture. Be sure to check out the “A Day in the Life” series, which gives you an idea of the average workday for FSOs in each career track.
• Diplomatic Mom – An FSO mother and wife discusses foreign culture and life (bonus points for being married to another FSO). Also includes a very informative series of posts detailing the process to become a Foreign Service Officer, daily life as a diplomat, and the logistics of moving and raising a family on a tour.
• Adventures in Good Countries – A blog by Katie Kiser, an FSO who completed a tour in Lahore, Pakistan.
• Life After Jerusalem – Commentary by an American FSO of Indian heritage who provides an LGBT perspective. Frequently updated.
• A Diplomat’s Wife – A blog with a more personal perspective of FSO life written by the wife of a diplomat. Provides a good idea of family life in the Foreign Service.
• You Can Call Me Al – FSO Al Caniglia recently completed his language training and began a tour in Germany. Worth following if you want to see what a tour is like from the beginning.
• The B Files – A diplomat and mother who just completed her first tour in the Dominican Republic. Must-read for those thinking of a mid-career application to the Foreign Service.
• Mabsuta Bideshi – Written by Sharlina Hussain-Morgan, an American of Bengali heritage from New York State who recently completed her first tour in London and is heading to Cairo next.
• Worldwide Availability – A blog by an American and Berkeley alum who immigrated from China at the age of 16. After making a career change from online marketing, he completed his first overseas tour in Seoul and is currently serving a tour in Malaysia.
• Email From the Embassy – Also written by an FSO spouse, this blog discusses the challenge of families dealing with unaccompanied tours.

(Read parts one and two)

In this post, I’m going to discuss what is perhaps the most essential element of an insurgency/counterinsurgency wargame: political mechanics.

Most wargames understandably focus on the combat aspect of a conflict. After all, recreating an epic naval battle or demolishing your enemy’s tank formations in a pocket is a lot more interesting than simulating negotiations on a peace treaty or writing a constitution for a new government. All wars are about politics, but simulating the political aspect of a war would not add value to the vast majority of wargames. Insurgency games are some of the few exceptions.

Before detailing the political mechanics of the insurgency wargame, I’d first like to talk about a game that mixes politics and war just right. Crusader Kings 2, a medieval grand strategy game by Paradox Interactive, simulates feudal dynasties from 1066 (just before the Norman invasion of England) to the mid-1400s. Unlike Paradox’s other strategy games, and indeed unlike most other grand strategy games in general, Crusader Kings 2 focuses on character-based play. Landed nobles living in a feudal system scheme to usurp each other’s titles, assassinate each other, curry favor with the Pope, carve out a Christian kingdom in the Holy Land, and a wide variety of other era-appropriate activities. Players set their own goals, whether it’s to mend the schism between the Christian churches, get elected as the new Holy Roman Emperor, or simply keep their rivals from amassing too much power.

Part of Crusader Kings 2’s appeal is that players have a variety of methods available to achieve a political goal. (For an example, see this post by a Reddit user describing how he managed to get an Irish Catholic to ascend the Byzantine throne without participating in a single battle.) It is often easier to expand through strategic inheritance rather than war, which requires either levies (which make vassals unhappy) or mercenaries (which are expensive). A powerful rival noble that would thump you in a war can be taken down a notch by convincing the Pope to excommunicate him, or you can simply plot with his unhappy courtiers to assassinate him. The simulation of dynasties and extensive family trees adds another layer of possible intrigue; strict inheritance laws mean that you can predict a line of succession and identify possible troublemaking claimants to a title.

A screenshot from Crusader Kings 2. By simulating noble dynasties, the game can represent politics in historically-appropriate ways, such as the formation of alliances through marriage.

Crusader Kings 2 translates the political and military dimensions of medieval Europe into a system of mechanics that allow for a great deal of experimentation while recreating the constraints and pressures that historical nobles faced. This is quite a feat, keeping in mind that as a commercial product it strives for recreational value rather than historical or simulation value.

The tabletop format restricts how detailed the political-military system can be in an insurgency wargame. This is not necessarily a problem, and can in fact be a benefit. Abstracting elements that are not crucial to the simulation (for example, in a wargame about insurgency, you may not be interested in the intricacies of the supply and logistics chain that sustains a military effort) makes the entire system more accessible and easier to balance. To use Crusader Kings 2 as an example again, the balance between Christian and Muslim realms often changes dramatically after an update patch because of the sheer number of variables at play. In the initial release, Andalusian Muslims were more likely than not to overrun the Spanish kingdoms; in the current version, the Reconquista can easily be accomplished more than 200 years ahead of time. It’s easier to design a game that conforms to realistic processes and constraints if it has fewer moving parts. On the other hand, simpler games are at greater risk of having design predetermine their outcome.

And with that ramblingly long preamble out of the way, let me finally explain the fairly simple political mechanics of the insurgency wargame. The current Afghan war will be used as an example for illustrative purposes.

Political Capital

A variety of resource concepts are abstracted into the basic unit of “political capital.” This represents different things to different factions; thus, for example, the social capital of strong tribal relationships can locally match the effect of the incredible financial capital of a foreign, first world superpower. Political capital (PC) is required for a variety of actions, from training and deploying troops to swaying public opinion to win an election or buy legitimacy. Political capital can be traded between factions as a bargaining chip, though there are some caveats, as not all political capital is equal.

PC given by a foreign occupier, such as the US in Afghanistan, represents money, weapons, and advisory assistance that can be universally redistributed and utilized. Other player factions, representing tribal or ethnic factions, are more limited in their political power. A southern Pashtun faction has less influence with a northern Uzbek faction than it does with eastern Pashtuns, which in turn it is less influential with than its own southern Pashtuns. A player faction that actually governs, such as the Government of Afghanistan, has PC with more universal application than local factions, making the goal of holding political power an attractive one. If the government is not popular or is not considered legitimate, its PC is devalued (i.e. more is required to accomplish a task), making it a less attractive bargaining chip.

For simplicity, PC is represented through token pieces that match the colors of factions. Thus, a Red player (local tribal faction) that possesses a great deal of White (Government of Afghanistan) political capital has a strong interest in making sure the White player’s government prospers. A Yellow player (local tribal faction) that is being supplied with ample PC from the Black (foreign occupier) player is incentivized to help Black fulfill its political goals, but White has no direct power over him. If Green is capable of generating more than enough of its own PC because of its incredible popularity in a given territory, it has little incentive to accept PC from White or Black—unless it has ambitions to national power beyond its local territory, where its own PC holds little sway.

The relationships between factions, their corresponding populations, and their political goals determine player strategies; political capital is the medium through which those elements interact.

The Focus Matrix

The most important distinction between player factions is their political goal, as everything else essentially stems from that desired outcome. Players can move toward their goal in a variety of ways, but the relative simplicity of a game compared to the real world means a significant loss of cues and signaling to be interpreted by other parties, especially if each “turn” represents a large period of time. There must also be some degree of representation of the strengths and drawbacks of factions. After all, insurgency/counter-insurgency is not chess—the players are not identical. Insurgents are not as well-organized as government forces, but they are more effective than if they were. Government forces generally have better equipment and training, but have a harder time building support in a contested area.

The solution is the focus matrix, which allows players to organizationally orient themselves toward subgroups of the population to facilitate generating more political capital. There are two areas of focus: the faction divide (this represents whatever classification is used to divide the population in the scenario, whether economic class, ethnicity, tribal affiliation, religion, etc.) and the urban/rural divide. Within the two areas of focus, each level represents a collection of efforts including propaganda and outreach, recruitment, patronage, and other activities. Among other things, levels of focus affect a player’s ability to generate political capital from the group in question.

Players can spend political capital to attain more levels of focus, going for either a deep focus (building up levels in one or two factions and in either urban or rural focus) or a wide focus (building up levels equally among factions and in both urban and rural options). Deeper focus on one group comes with the drawback of negatively modifying the player’s orientation toward other groups. Territorially-limited groups will find it easy to focus deeply on their own population and build-up type (urban or rural), but a government player without an abundance of political capital will have to choose their focus carefully and make the right agreements with other players.

In my previous post, I discussed in general terms my objective in designing a new manual insurgency wargame and some of the basic concepts it should seek to simulate. I know this is a very belated follow-up, but in the meantime I have been learning Python and considering turning this project into a computer simulation. That would be a daunting task, so for now I am sticking with the manual format with the aim of turning it digital down the line.

The wargame can be divided into roughly two realms: the environment and the players.  In this post, I’ll discuss the environment and mechanics involving it.

The environment is divided into regions at a level that make sense for the design of the scenario, whether that be villages and neighborhoods, cities and towns, or entire provinces. Choosing this lowest level of representation is a balance between complexity and utility; representing politics or combat at the provincial level involves far more abstraction and less choice than representing them at the local village level.

The main feature of the environment is terrain, and for simplicity each region contains a single type of dominant terrain. In this simulation, terrain will affect the results of combat events and the amount of effort required for a faction to gain support in a region. Each region also possesses a certain level of urban build-up, from none (uninhabited) to extremely dense. As expected, this affects a regional population’s size and demographics, as urban populations are more likely to contain significant diversity. This allows the possibility of an urban/rural divide among insurgent or loyalist factions.

Regions possess an objective value based on factors such as economic output, fertile land, presence of resources, etc. The subjective value of a region depends on a particular faction’s objectives and requirements, which are not necessarily known to other factions in the game. For example, a nationalist insurgent faction may have no interest in controlling a prosperous region held by an opposing faction because it contains an incompatible population type and is not part of the historical nation the faction seeks to establish. (These factors are taken into account in the player’s victory conditions, which are on a card given to the player at the beginning of the game and cannot be shown to anyone.) Instead, the faction might use violence to suppress the region’s economic value to the enemy without ever seeking a local base of support. Discerning the objectives of other factions is crucial to the political aspect of the game, especially negotiations with enemies and allies. Insurgencies do not happen in a vacuum, so a scenario should include historical context that suggests each faction’s likely end-state goals and territorial aspirations, but the specific victory conditions are confirmed only to the player. In claiming a set of objectives to other players, a player can tell the truth or bluff, but other players can never see his card to confirm the truth.

Control over a region is determined at two levels. First, there are governing structures that determine what faction exerts official control of the region. Just as a military force is sustained by supply, governing structures require support of the local population to function, though this does not necessarily mean the government in question is representative in nature. Support can also be projected from neighboring regions, though local support or lack thereof naturally has a stronger influence. Structures by competing factions can exist in the same region, making official control impossible. Alternatively, structures by cooperating factions allow for split control based on whatever agreement the factions make (e.g. a federal system).

Second, a region can be effectively controlled with a military force presence that suppresses existing governing structures. The disadvantage, of course, is that militarily controlling a region requires constant presence, along with the usurpation of governing structures and the complete removal of opposition forces. On the other hand, military control is not dependent on the local population’s disposition, making it ideal for a powerful but foreign player attempting to restore or install a local ally into place.

Control of zones will play an important part in combat, as changes in control can affect “momentum,” a mechanic that will allow factions to capitalize their successes or exploit enemy missteps. Tactical retreat from a region may make sense to preserve a limited military force, but it will affect public perception about the conflict (especially for a foreign faction) and boost enemy confidence.

In the next post, I’ll discuss political mechanics.

Ever since completing my first wargame, Fardh al-Qanoon, I’ve been eager to tackle the topic of insurgency once again with a more complex manual simulation. Fardh al-Qanoon simulated a local counter-insurgency campaign in a single city during a relatively short period of time, and while I hope it may play an educational role to someone trying to understand the Baghdad Security Plan, such a game is not terribly useful for analyzing counter-insurgency at the national level, which inevitably stretches over a substantial period of time.

Fardh al-Qanoon also lacked a critical element: politics. Insurgencies, like all wars, are about political objectives. The short time period of the game meant that the insurgent player’s victory conditions could not be based on actual political objectives of the real insurgents, since there was no way for the player to achieve them within the game’s timeframe. The Coalition player could not co-opt the insurgency through a mix of kinetic action and political accommodation, limiting the toolset the counter-insurgent had at his disposal to win.

The map for “Fardh al-Qanoon,” a simulation of the Baghdad Security Plan.

The two-player game also meant the non-player “third” faction (Iraqi Sunnis) could not be negotiated with. Rules governing such negotiations could have attempted to emulate a live human player representing the Sunnis, but then the problem of “gaming” a non-player faction arises. Randomization mitigates this somewhat, but the more randomness you introduce into a game, the less outcomes depend on player decisions, and thus the less useful the game is for education or analysis. There is, of course, a hard limit to how much you can accurately simulate in a wargame before it becomes far too complex and cumbersome, so carefully-designed randomization systems that abstract complexity can definitely be a benefit rather than a drawback.

These issues lingered in the back of my mind as I mulled over the idea of a new insurgency simulation. How should regular and guerrilla forces be represented? How should different quality forces be accounted for? How does a player decide when to use political methods or violence to achieve their objectives? How do players decide when to cooperate or compete with other players?

But most importantly of all: how can the simulation be universally applicable?

Developing a system rather than a scenario is the most important task of this project. Philip Sabin, my Conflict Simulation professor at King’s College London, wrote a book called Lost Battles that creates a model for simulating ancient battles, both Greek and Roman. Ancient Greeks, Romans, and their various opponents were obviously not uniform entities on the battlefield, but careful design allows the Lost Battles system to account for these differences in a relatively simple ruleset. Most importantly, it allows players to gain valuable insights from recreating battles ranging from the Battle of the Granicus to Cannae.

The objective of designing a “universal” insurgency wargame is essentially to create a system that can be tweaked to accurately recreate insurgent conflicts across time and space, though for simplicity it will focus on the post-1950s period. Afghanistan and Iraq, perhaps the two most popular contemporary examples, are obviously very different in culture, history, and terrain; the specific circumstances of each country constitute a “scenario,” and the simulation will serve as the “system” for the scenarios to be designed in. (This is similar to how Volko Ruhnke and Brian Train’s Afghanistan game, A Distant Plain, uses the same system as Ruhnke’s Andean Abyss, or how many computer strategy games come with map editors that allow you to create your own scenarios.)

Basic concepts

The basic concepts of the simulation should be general enough to apply to any insurgent conflict, with the state of their attendant variables distinguishing one specific conflict from another and creating the unique scenario that each insurgent conflict ultimately represents.

First, there is the population. The representation of the population in the simulation should give us an idea of its composition relative to the various factions represented in the simulation and the level of support of the population for factions. The population will be divided in zones of terrain that can represent administrative areas, historical regions, or whatever division of territory makes the most sense for a scenario. Each zone’s primary terrain type is an important factor in determining things like a population’s support for factions (e.g. remote, mountainous terrain is more difficult for a central government to extend its power to), results of military operations, etc.

Military force and political capital represent the two dimensions of a faction’s ability to shape the environment. Military forces can be conventional or irregular, with the former requiring greater resources to operate and the latter possessing some of the unique advantages guerrillas enjoy. The ultimate goal of a counterinsurgent or a competing political insurgency is to establish a governing presence in the disputed territory backed by local support.

In the next post, I’ll begin discussing mechanics of the system and how they might simulate the concepts outlined here

In the first green-on-blue attack in the month of December, an Afghan policewoman named Nargis (also spelled Nargas in some sources) reportedly shot and killed an ISAF civilian contractor at Kabul police headquarters, a secure compound. Nargis apparently planned to gain entry to the compound by attending a graduation ceremony for a police literacy course, but the ceremony was canceled. She then attempted to convince guards she wanted to see the Kabul police chief or the governor, but was told both officials were out. TOLO reports that she shot an American contractor named Joseph Griffin after he entered the area, while other reports indicate she went to the compound’s canteen and opened fire. This is the 46th green-on-blue attack in 2012 (43 have been documented in open sources), and comes 43 days after the last documented attack in Nad ‘Ali, Helmand. NY Times reports Mr. Griffin worked as a police trainer for DynCorp.

Western sources report Nargis is a 33-year-old sergeant in the Afghan National Police, and her husband is either a policeman or civilian employee of the Ministry of Interior. She has been on the force for between four to six years and does not have a criminal record or known ties to militant groups. Sources told TOLO that Nargis was a refugee in both Pakistan and Iran and speaks with traces of an Iranian dialect. She also reportedly went missing for two days during a recent government-sponsored trip to Egypt, claiming she was “lost in the unfamiliar city.”

In a notable exception to its general trend of claiming credit after every publicly-reported incident, the Taliban has not claimed credit for this insider attack and instead simply relayed reports about it on its website (Arabic here, shortened English version here). It should be noted that Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid describes Nargis as a 40-year-old Second Lieutenant (no rank is mentioned in the Arabic version of the message).

The latest Defense Department 1230 report (pdf) estimates that 6% of insider attacks are likely caused by infiltration, 14% by co-option, 3% unknown by likely related to insurgents, and 38% by personal grievances. It is difficult to determine the cause of individual attacks from open sources, but the Taliban is almost certainly not responsible for the proportion of attacks they claim. According to ISAF and information reported on the Institute for the Study of War’s Green-on-Blue site, there have been 87 green-on-blue insider attacks since 2007. Of these, 14 (or 16%) have not been reported in open sources, nor has the Taliban claimed credit for them. This indicates that the Taliban exploits the opportunity to claim credit once they see a public report of a recent incident. Whether or not the Taliban actually manages to play a role, insider attacks have been a boon to insurgents. The green-on-blue problem has affected the public narrative of the war in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia and sown distrust between ISAF troops and the Afghan forces they train or fight alongside.

In response to the summer spike in green-on-blue incidents in 2012, ISAF implemented new policies to mitigate the threat posed by insider attacks. As such attacks become more difficult to carry out against foreigners, Afghan forces have become the primary targets of recent insider attacks (“green-on-green”). As a female police officer, Nargis may have encountered less stringent scrutiny by male guards, allowing her to pass three checkpoints and enter the secure Kabul police headquarters with her police-issued weapon. ISAF will likely review its new policies to identify similar security gaps and close them. While green-on-blue attacks are unlikely to rise to their summer 2012 levels again, it would be extremely difficult to stop them completely, short of ending the ISAF training mission and segregating all foreign and Afghan forces.

Read more about the Christmas Eve insider attack

• Pajhwok: Afghan poliecwoman guns down ISAF advisor
• TOLOnews: Policewoman in Insider Attack Likely Acted with Premeditation: Source
• Khaama: American adviser shot dead by Afghan poliecwoman
• NY Times: U.S. Civilian Is Killed at Police Post in Kabul
• BBC: Afghan ‘rogue’ attacks kill US aide and five police

Julie Meyer Super, my fellow War Studies alum, just published her first journal article on India’s relations with the U.S. and Iran in Asia Policy. Check out the advance release copy (pdf). Below is the article’s executive summary.

Balancing Rivals: India’s Tightrope between Iran and the United States

Executive Summary

This article examines India’s bilateral relations with the U.S. and Iran and argues that Indian interests, rather than increased pressure from the U.S., will continue to shape New Delhi’s policies toward Iran.

Main Argument

In light of steady economic growth since the turn of the century, the Indian government has positioned energy security as a key foreign policy consideration to sustain the economic and social development crucial to India’s rise in the international system. Within this framework, India has been required to perform a delicate balancing act in relations with Iran and the U.S. This article maintains that Indian interests, rather than U.S. pressure, will determine the course of India’s relations with Iran. This conclusion is drawn from an analysis of India’s bilateral relations with both countries, giving due consideration to India’s energy security needs, internal dynamics, ties with Israel, and regional interests.

Policy Implications

• Energy security will remain a key consideration in Indian foreign policy for the foreseeable future. Although investment in alternative sources of energy will help reduce the perceived need for relations with Iran, the sufficient development of such sources remains a long-term aspiration.

• New Delhi’s continued emphasis on strategic autonomy undercuts efforts by Washington to influence Indo-Iranian relations. Engaging India in international energy forums, such as the International Energy Agency, will encourage dialogue on developing alternative solutions to India’s energy security needs while allowing India to preserve its strategic autonomy.

• India’s relations with Iran could prove to be a useful bridge between the U.S. and Iran. Rather than push to curb these ties, Washington may find value in considering New Delhi’s potential role as an interlocutor in reaching out to Tehran.

On Friday, October 19th, a firefight between Afghan policemen in Jaji Maidan, Khost resulted in three deaths. According to local officials, the firefight broke out as a result of a dispute between families (the Taliban, of course, claimed credit and said the attacker is now safe with them).

That same day, a cook working for the Afghan police in Nahr-e Saraj, Helmand attempted to kill several officers by poisoning their food. Perhaps out of impatience, he and another Afghan policeman returned to shoot and kill two of the officers. Not long after, insurgents attacked the checkpoint the police were manning and killed four more.

These “green-on-green” attacks (where Afghan security forces attack their Afghan comrades), already being dubbed insider attacks by Afghan and Western media, are different from but closely linked to the green-on-blue attacks that have been making headlines since August. While ISAF has been the primary target of insider attacks, many Afghan troops have been killed as well. (For resources to track green-on-blue attacks, click here).

We don’t know enough about insider attacks to say whether they are primarily driven by grievances or infiltration, but the October 19th incidents highlight the vulnerability ISAF and Afghan forces suffer from both.

The green-on-green attack in Helmand echoes the complexity of the green-on-blue attack on US soldiers in Wardak on September 29th. In that attack, a patrol of about 20 US soldiers was ambushed by Afghan soldiers at a checkpoint, possibly supported by insurgents from multiple directions. The shootings by an Afghan policeman and cook in Helmand was followed up with an attack by insurgents, who may have been expecting weakened resistance after the cook’s poisoning effort.

The Taliban has undoubtedly noted the media impact of the recent spike in insider attacks. As they suffer attrition at the hands of ISAF and backlash from Afghans in villages throughout the country, they will seek the exploit the opportunity that insider attacks provide, and the Wardak and Helmand attacks may be the first signs of an organized attempt to do so. ISAF’s change in policies and troop postures on bases in response to the increase in green-on-blue attacks necessitates more complex planning and may lead to a preference for targeting Afghan forces as foreign troops become increasingly harder to kill.

With the Taliban’s overall  strategic goal of reconquering Afghanistan after 2014 in mind, the likely aims of planned insider violence are to sap foreign public (primarily American) support for the war, reduce the quality of ANSF training by poisoning their relationship with ISAF, and reduce ANSF efficacy by sowing chaos and damaging morale within the forces. Executing green-on-blue and green-on-green attacks encourages the spread of grievance-based insider attacks through the copycat effect, further aiding the Taliban’s efforts to weaken Afghan security forces.

A Royal United Services Institute report co-authored by Michael Semple, Anatol Lieven, Theo Farrell, and Rudra Chaudhuri (the latter three from my alma mater, KCL), contains a rather amazing claim:

The Taliban are prepared to accept a long-term US military presence in Afghanistan… the guiding principle, according to [an intervieww], was that US military bases and continuing presence of soldiers would be acceptable to a level ‘that does not impinge on our independence and religion.’

– Taliban Perspectives on Reconciliation

The RUSI report is based on interviews with four “senior Taliban interlocutors,” who spoke to the authors about the Quetta Shura Taliban ostensibly led by Mullah Mohammad Omar (but de facto controlled by other actors, including Pakistan’s ISI). The interviewee who provided the most insight on the question of US bases (referred to as “B”) is described as:

a former Taliban deputy minister and a founding member of the Taliban. B was part of the group that pushed its way into Kandahar in the early 1990s… He also made clear that he was choosing his words carefully to represent, as far as possible, the general and genuine views of the movement in response to our questions.

Not surprisingly, others associated with the Taliban movement were firm in their denial of such a position. Sayed Akbar Agha, a former Taliban commander, called the statements false and said they were purely based on RUSI’s own opinions. Zabihullah Mujahid, a Taliban spokesman, also called the report baseless and “a lie.”

The report is already being frequently cited in blogs and news stories, sometimes in an almost casual, flippant way (e.g. something along the lines of “…a report indicates the Taliban are willing to accept military bases…”). Context is, of course, ignored. Citations of the RUSI report assume the Taliban to be a unitary actor, and further assume that the individuals interviewed are actually representative of that unitary enemy. In reality, the Quetta Shura has both political and military wings, which further break down into several committees and competing personalities. (See the Long War Journal’s dated but still excellent primer on the Afghan Taliban’s leadership.)

So the question is: does the claim represent a potentially exploitable fault line within the Taliban, or just faulty information?

If there are truly elements of the Taliban that would be willing to accept US military bases in Afghanistan, it could indicate a desire for a balancing influence against Pakistan, which will certainly seek to have a strong influence in Afghanistan after the eventual American withdrawal. While elements of the Pakistani army, government, and intelligence services support insurgent groups, their interests are certainly not perfectly aligned, and current insurgent groups will want to break free of Pakistani influence in a post-US Afghanistan.

The more likely answer is that the authors of the RUSI report simply received a single individual’s opinion, which was then enthusiastically presented as being more informative and indicative of a wider sentiment among Taliban leaders than it really is. Until we start hearing such opinions being expressed by insiders within the actual Quetta Shura Taliban (and not anonymously), we shouldn’t lend too much weight to claims like the ones in the RUSI report. Furthermore, the political and military wings of the QST must align in their opinions if a political settlement is to be successful. There is no use in negotiating a peace with one group if its fighters reject it and continue their insurgency.

The insurgency in Afghanistan has defied the United States and ISAF’s attempts to quell it for almost a decade, and to some extent has even defied attempts to understand it. The academic literature about insurgency in Afghanistan teems with theories for its development and sustenance, but another way to examine the complex phenomenon is through models. Models attempt to distill the essential elements of a subject and define their relationships within a system, a process that can greatly aid in understanding and discussing an insurgency. Furthermore, a model’s users can view the insurgency and debate ideas on a common platform, avoiding some of the inherent ambiguity of language with the precision of a model’s terms and definitions.

While models can potentially be powerful analytic tools in studying insurgency, existing models of insurgency in Afghanistan or insurgency in general focus too narrowly on specific aspects of insurgency without integrating them into a wider context. Insurgency is obviously a complex phenomenon, but a model does not necessarily have to be bloated and complicated to accurately reflect its processes as a whole. Before such a model can be developed, a careful look at existing models is necessary.

Existing models of insurgency

This list is not comprehensive, but instead a selection of useful models that can inform the development of a generalized model of insurgency.

• COIN Hybrid Model
  David & Kristin Arney: Modeling insurgency, counter-insurgency, and coalition strategies and operations
• Power-law Model
  Johnson et al.: Pattern in Escalations in Insurgent and Terrorist Activity
  Bohorquez et al.: Common ecology quantifies human insurgency
• Ising-based model of changes in public opinion
  Jonathan David Farley: Evolutionary Dynamics of the Insurgency in Iraq: A Mathematical model of the Battle for Hearts and Minds 
• Population Dynamics Model
  John Sokolowski  and Catherine Banks: From empirical data to mathematical model – using population dynamics to characterize insurgencies
• Point Process Model
  Zammit-Mangion et al.: Point process modelling of the Afghan War Diary
• Insurgency Management Model
  Edward G. Anderson, Jr.: A Proof-of-Concept Model for Evaluating Insurgency Management Policies Using the System Dynamics Methodology